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CHAPTER 8
Welfare − Focusing on the Neediest
with a Simple Scoring Model
Abstract This chapter describes the introduction of a new welfare formula
in Georgia that replaced a myriad of pre-existing social subsidies and tax
breaks, many of which had been introduced to win the favor of voters prior
to elections. These subsidies were ﬂat and tied to all manner of products
and services, from electricity to public transport, and they beneﬁtted very
different groups of people, from single mothers to war veterans. In a bold
move, the new government froze most of these subsidies. To make sure
that what little funds were available in the post-reform budget went to the
neediest people, a scoring model for poverty based on property and living
expenses was introduced. Based on this model the “[p]overty rates
decreased from 21 percent in 2010 to less than 15 percent in 2012, and
extreme poverty decreased from 7 percent in 2010 to 4 percent in 2012”
(according to the Word Bank).
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Corruption is already a thing of the past. The ﬁscal footprint of the state is
cut down to size, providing stability and promoting long-term sustainabil-
ity of the national economy. Taxes and customs are minimized, and the
administration is streamlined to provide citizens and entrepreneurs with
easy access to government agencies and institutions. Case closed? Not
quite. One challenge remains: ﬁnding a way to ensure that government
© The Author(s) 2017
N. Gilauri, Practical Economics,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-45769-7_8
139
funds are used wisely to support the future growth and prosperity of the
country, and the well-being of its citizens. It’s not enough to take one
smart decision, or ten, or a hundred. The real challenge is to embed
sustainable ﬁnancing of public services in public policy. In other words,
the challenge is to trigger a virtuous cycle and build a legacy of smart
spending.
8.1 WELFARE IN GEORGIA BEFORE 2004
At the turn of the millennium, Georgia was facing bankruptcy. This was
largely due to the fact that a myriad of social subsidies and tax breaks had
been introduced over time, usually to win the favor of voters prior to an
election. These subsidies included all kinds of products and services, from
gas and electricity to public transport and housing, and they were designed
to beneﬁt very different groups of people, from single mothers and large
families to war veterans. In a bold move, the government transformed
most of these ﬂat subsidies into means-tested supports.1 To make sure that
what little funds were available in the post-reform budget went to the
neediest people, a scoring model for poverty based on property and living
expenses was introduced. In most cases, income was disregarded because it
would have been too difﬁcult to track, given that most low-paying jobs
were part of the gray economy at the time. Based on this model, the new
department of welfare singled out the 20 percent of the population that
was most in need of assistance.
8.2 SOCIAL SUBSIDIES AS ELECTORAL BRIBES
Every country, be it developing or developed, piles up new types of welfare
support with every election cycle. Before an election, every party comes up
with new ideas for wealth redistribution to win the favor of the electorate.
These ideas take different shapes (direct subsidies, tax credits, tax incen-
tives), and they target different groups of voters, depending on whose
votes are most contested in a given election. After the election, the win-
ning party is under pressure to keep some, if not all, of its promises.
Fortunately, Otto von Bismarck was right when he said that “people
never lie as much as after a hunt, during a war, and before an election.”2
If all pre-election promises to shower the electorate with wealth and
favors were actually kept, many countries, if not the whole world, would
long have gone bankrupt by now. Yet far too many welfare promises
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become a costly reality. Although such politically motivated subsidies
are often a very inefﬁcient means to ﬁght poverty and promote prosper-
ity, the next generation of politicians is usually hesitant to reduce or
abolish any of them, lest they lose the favor of those who beneﬁt from
the subsidies. As a result, the subsidies remain in place until the next
crisis. And it takes a really serious crisis to clean up the mess and put
together a smart, efﬁcient, well-balanced welfare system. And even if
you get it done, chances are it won’t last forever. With the next electoral
cycle, the pile-up will start all over again. In this respect, a truly serious
crisis is an opportunity. In the case of Georgia in the early 2000s, it was
the imminent bankruptcy of the state that put the government in a
position to start from scratch. Elsewhere, the opportunity might arise
from a serious geopolitical challenge or a fundamental regime change,
such as the introduction of a new form of government.
At the time, Georgia’s welfare system consisted of dozens of different
subsidies, tax breaks, and cash payouts to a wide and diverse range of
beneﬁciaries. In fact, the Georgian welfare system was like a log of the
country’s history in many respects. It comprised cash support for veterans
and family members of those who died in the Second World War, veterans
and family members of those who died in the Soviet war in Afghanistan,
veterans and family members of those who died in the war for the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of Georgia (in the occupied territories of
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region), for political victims of Soviet rule
and members of their families, for people who suffered injuries at the
hands of the Soviet army during the Tbilisi massacre in April 1989 and
members of the families of those who died there, for those who went to
Chernobyl after the nuclear reactor catastrophe, and displaced persons
from Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region. Additionally, there were social
welfare beneﬁts for various groups: single mothers, families with ﬁve or
more children, people with physical disabilities (ﬁrst, second, and third
grade), and pensioners – men above the age of 65 and women above the
age of 60. The full list was much longer, and there were additional
healthcare subsidies for some of these groups.
8.3 CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY
On top of the cash payouts and healthcare subsidies, the Georgian welfare
system comprised many non-cash subsidies for speciﬁc groups such as
pensioners, students, and internally displaced persons. Examples include
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transport, electricity, gas, and schoolbooks. Finally, there were some tax
and customs incentives. Cigarette imports, for instance, were exempt from
customs payment for people with physical disabilities during a certain
period. While the exemption may have been well intentioned at the
time, it was quickly exploited by criminals. Suddenly, every importer was
a disabled person. Of course, these individuals only acted as straw men for
companies that did their business behind the scenes. Corruption was
common in other areas as well. People bribed doctors to issue false
disability certiﬁcates, or used the names of deceased family members to
receive pensions, leading the authorities to believe that these pensioners
were still alive. Others got even more creative and invented identities
solely to swindle the government. Around 2007, the number of Second
World War veterans started to increase, when it should, naturally have
been decreasing as aging veterans passed away. Apparently, somebody had
found “new” veterans who had eluded registration before. Of course,
these claims turned out to be fraudulent.
The beneﬁts often didn’t reach those they were intended for, or at least
not in full. And while the list of beneﬁciaries may sound plausible at ﬁrst,
the total number of those entitled to some sort of subsidy was so high that
the amount received by a given family or individual was often shamefully
small. For example, the average pension for the elderly only came to about
USD 8–9 per month before 2004, and even that small sum was not paid
by the government in full, or in time. Similarly, the monthly cash beneﬁt
for a disabled or internally displaced person was only USD 5–6, and that
wasn’t fully paid out either. On the ﬂip side, some recipients didn’t need
the subsidies at all. For example, some displaced persons were wealthy
individuals for whom the subsidies were a welcome but entirely unneces-
sary source of additional income.
In effect, the entire system was highly inefﬁcient. It didn’t reliably
provide support to the neediest, and it awarded beneﬁts to many people
who didn’t need them. The inadequacy of the system was apparent to all,
but almost everybody had something to lose from ﬁxing it, which is why
Georgia had to get so close to bankruptcy for things to change.
8.4 INBUILT INERTIA
Even after the Rose Revolution, it was initially impossible to get rid of any
subsidies, or even ward off the introduction of new beneﬁts. How do you
say no to single mothers and struggling families? Every time the new
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government went to parliament with a new budget, the opposition would
argue that it’s well and good to support families with more than ﬁve
children, but why not support families with three or four children as
well? Why not give more money to needy children directly? In the absence
of a sound political culture – a big issue in many developing countries – the
opposition does not have to come up with ways of ﬁnancing such
demands. Voters like what they hear, and it becomes even more difﬁcult
for any government to say no. In fact, this vicious cycle of demands and
promises was one of the key drivers that brought Georgia to the brink of
bankruptcy in early 2000’s. This kind of vicious cycle is not at all uncom-
mon. Similar systems are found in many other countries, developing as
well as developed, and they are almost always plagued by corruption and
inefﬁciency to some extent.
8.5 STARTING FROM SCRATCH WITH A SCORING MODEL
In Georgia, the ﬁnancial situation got so serious that the government had
no choice but to start from scratch and come up with an entirely new
approach to social welfare. The only fair solution was, and still is, to
identify the poorest segments of society and assist them, regardless of
whether they are single mothers, families with ﬁve children, or displaced
persons.
The governing idea was very simple. Georgia is not a rich country.
It cannot afford to waste its resources on those who are relatively wealthy
when many of the poor are going unassisted. Increasing taxes to ﬁnance
social expenditure was out of the question because of the crisis the national
economy was in. Any tax increase would have been disastrous for the newly
developing private sector. The government had to minimize the inefﬁcien-
cies and target the neediest with what little means it had. To this end, the
government issued an announcement: “If you deem yourself poor, please
register at the nearest government ofﬁce to apply for assistance.”
Approximately 28 percent of all Georgians applied. Also, it quickly became
obvious that some people had applied just to try their luck. For example, the
list of applicants included some businessmen who were hoping for special
tax breaks. A special department was created to develop a scoringmodel for
all households.
It took a while to come up with a workable formula. The initial scoring
model was mainly based on ownership, rather than income or expenses.
This was because income was largely unregistered, especially for the
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poorest parts of society. Their income came from small-scale trade, from
selling homegrown produce, or subsistence farming. The original list of
line items that were incorporated into the formula included land, houses,
apartments, and automobiles – all obviously relevant to determine, or at
least approximate, someone’s wealth from a property perspective. But the
original list also included many other, less obvious items such as carpets,
curtains, mobile phones, TV sets, and other electronic appliances. Many of
these items were gifts from wealthier relatives, or had been left to families
as part of an inheritance, which is why this approach caused signiﬁcant
frustration among the population. It took many iterations to develop a
fairer formula. In the end, we settled on a formula essentially based on two
pillars: proven property (land, house, apartment, and vehicle) and veriﬁ-
able expenses (rent, mobile phone bill, electricity bill, and gas and water
utility bill). Income is also part of the formula, but its weight is minimal as
most of the prospective beneﬁciaries operated in the gray economy or had
in-kind income, which made it impossible, or disproportionately difﬁcult,
to quantify their income in a reliable fashion.
The calculation of the welfare index for each applicant was based on the
results of an interview conducted by a social worker, using a questionnaire
that covered all the parameters used in the formula. The household welfare
index was calculated according to the formula I = C/N, where C is a
household consumption index and N is a household needs index. The
lower the resulting welfare index, the lower the household welfare level.
The household consumption index itself was calculated according to the
following formula:





In this formula, L0 is a base coefﬁcient. SummandsC1 throughC10 are index
values for parameters such as land use, livestock ownership, non-agricultural
property, income, expenses, demography, education, skills, living conditions,
and territory.3
A new department of welfare was created to implement the new for-
mula. Many of its social workers were hired straight out of university. Every
single application for social subsidies was checked, and often re-checked,
to prevent any corrupt deals between government agents and applicants.
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It turned out that approximately a quarter of the applicants did not meet
the government’s criteria for poverty, a wealth score below 120,000 points.
While some entrepreneurs and owners of businesses had applied, hoping
for special tax cuts or tax credits (as mentioned above) others were simply
trying their luck. One family went so far as to take all furniture from one
house to another. They submitted a forged rental agreement and showed
the social worker around their empty house, claiming that they didn’t own
anything and didn’t have any income. Ultimately, one-ﬁfth of the popula-
tion was identiﬁed as poor and, hence, entitled to some kind of ﬁnancial
assistance. Most of these households were already receiving some beneﬁts
from existing programs.
In the ﬁrst year of the reform, it was decided that every household with a
score below 57,000 would receive a cash beneﬁt of approximately USD 20
per person per month. Why USD 20? Why every household with less than
57,000 points? Because this was exactly what was affordable within the limits
of the budget at that time. All non-cash subsidies were abolished, and the
funds that were freed up were used to ﬁnance the new, score-based cash
program. The department of welfare gavemoney to the poorest and let them
use it as they saw ﬁt – on transportation, on utility payments, or on food,
assuming that every individual is the best judge of what they need the most.
In the second phase, the same group of beneﬁciaries (members of
households with a score below 57,000 points) received medical insur-
ance vouchers on top of the cash assistance (see later in the text). In the
third year, some 15 percent of households scoring between 57,000 and
70,000 points also received insurance vouchers. No cash beneﬁts were
awarded to this new group, as this would have exceeded the long-term
ﬁnancial means of the government. The ultimate test of any new measure
was the long-term viability of the welfare system, irrespective of a given
year’s ﬁnancial resources. The idea was, and still is, to verify the entitle-
ment of beneﬁciaries on an annual basis by determining their scores, to
give assistance only in cash, or in insurance vouchers, to the poorest as
warranted by the long-term ﬁnancial means of the government. Of
course, it remains very difﬁcult from a political perspective to remove
any household from the list of beneﬁciaries, especially in an election year.
This fact has weakened the reform, but the new system is still far superior
to the preceding chaos. As a next step, the government may want to
think about replacing the threshold-based approach with a sliding scale
allocation of assistance (i.e., cash paid out in direct proportion to a
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household’s score). This will put an end to relative injustices, such as
a household with the score of 56,999 receiving the full assistance and
another one, with a score of 57,001, not receiving anything.
The new formula was ﬁrst introduced in Georgia in 2006. It had many
ﬂaws, and many mistakes were made; but as a result of continuous
improvements to the formula and to its administration, the results were
outstanding. Of course, Georgia’s overall economic growth also helped.
According to the World Bank, the Georgian welfare program was one of
the most successful in the world in terms of targeting the neediest:
“Poverty rates decreased from 21 percent in 2010 to less than 15 percent
in 2012, and extreme poverty decreased from 7 percent in 2010 to
4 percent in 2012.”4
Despite the very successful reform, some subsidies survived. The
plan was to phase them out over time. However, during the next
political cycle, some former subsidies were resurrected, e.g., the sub-
sidy of public transport for pensioners. I still believe that the welfare
reform conducted in Georgia between 2006 and 2010 was very suc-
cessful, and that many countries would beneﬁt from introducing simi-
lar systems. The central idea is as simple as it is powerful: put an end to
a myriad of subsidies and non-cash ﬂat beneﬁts to different, partly
random groups of beneﬁciaries. Instead, identify the neediest, categor-
ize them based on their ﬁnancial means, and provide them with cash
assistance to the extent that the government can afford. Let the need-
iest decide how to spend these funds. Stay away from non-cash ﬂat
subsidies or tax breaks that will often make the rich richer, rather than
help the poor. For example, if the government subsidizes gas (petrol),
those who consume the most – drivers of sports cars, or owners of a
ﬂeet of trucks – will beneﬁt the most.
When the government of Georgia went to parliament with the new
system, it was easy to counter the opposition’s questions and demands
with fact-based replies: “Yes, we provide welfare assistance to single
mothers, as well as to families with ﬁve or more children. In fact, we
even help families with two or three children. We give assistance to people
with disabilities, and they get more than they did in the past. But we give
money only to those families who need the assistance the most. Georgia
cannot afford to give money to rich people with disabilities, or to rich
families with seven children.” Politically, getting parliamentary approval
for a new budget, or any type of reform, had never been easier.
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NOTES
1. No new beneﬁciaries were accepted into these programs. Existing beneﬁci-
aries were given a choice to keep receiving the old subsidies or to upgrade to
the new formula, which resulted in higher total payments. Of course, every-
body chose the new welfare program. Effectively, most of the old subsidies
seized to exist.
2. Im neuen Reich: Wochenschrift für das Leben des deutschen Volkes in Staat,
Wissenschaft und Kunst, Band 1; Band 9; Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1879, p. 199.
3. Household welfare level evaluation methodology; internal document available
through the author.
4. http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2014/04/15/supporting-inclu
sive-growth-and-development-in-georgia (retrieved in April 2014).
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